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Kenya and South Africa both face unique challenges in attempting to bridge the
gap between those who have access to formal financial institutions and those who do not.
The development of mobile banking and its broad accessibility and affordability, in both
countries, has led to it being heralded as a great tool for increasing access to banking
institutions.
Kenya and South Africa have followed different regulatory paths. Kenya has
taken an open regulatory approach, whilst South Africa has taken a closed regulatory
approach. This thesis identifies the key regulatory differences between South Africa and
Kenya by conducting secondary data analysis focusing on the periods when both
countries liberalized their banking sectors and telecommunications sectors. This thesis
also illustrates how these two paths have influenced the development of financial
inclusion in both countries and explores whether any of these paths may be more
advantageous for advancing mobile banking services.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Mobile banking, a form of electronic banking that allows individuals to access
financial services through their mobile phones, has grown tremendously in sub-Saharan
Africa over the last decade (Lawack-Davids 2012). Mobile banking has allowed millions
of African’s who were previously unable to access banking services due to barriers such
as high costs and transportation are now be able to conduct basic banking transactions on
their mobile phone.
Globally, more than 2 billion adults do not own a bank account, and a majority of
those individuals are located in the global south (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper Singer and
Van Oudheusden, 2015). In sub-Saharan Africa specifically, only 34% of adults reported
that they had a bank account in 2014, whilst in high income developed countries, over
94% of individuals reported having a bank account (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper Singer and
Van Oudheusden, 2015). Mobile bank accounts, which are virtual accounts and are not
tied to any financial institution, have contributed to increasing the number of account
holders in sub-Saharan Africa (Lyman, Pickens and Porteus 2008). According to the
World Bank Findex 2014 data 12% of adults in sub-Saharan Africa indicated that they
have mobile bank account, worldwide only 2% of adults indicated they have a mobile
bank account (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper Singer and Van Oudheusden, 2015).
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Sub-Saharan Africa in 2014 accounted for the majority, 53%, of new mobile
services launches globally (GMSA 2014). Another significant difference is that a
majority of Sub-Saharan Africa regions, 81%, have some form of access to mobile
money, whilst Europe is still growing at 14% (GSMA 2014). This highlights how
different needs are for Africans compared to the rest of the world; in 2012 Africa had
higher mobile phone growth rates, 41%, compared to Europe which had 30% growth rate
(Yonazi, Kelly, Halewood and Blackmanand 2012). The enormous growth of mobile
banking has also placed it at the center of conversations about increasing financial
inclusion.
Government policies and commitment to making mobile banking broadly
accessible can form a crucial component to increasing levels of mobile banking.
However, Collins (2011), states that African governments, through central banks, have
taken a conservative, closed regulatory, approach to regulating mobile banking and have
consequently entrenched commercial banks as dominant players in the mobile money
value chain. Numerous studies have identified how regulatory policies can either hinder
the development mobile banking or allow it flourish (see Ashta 2010; Asongu 2013;
Brown, Cajee, Davies and Stroebel 2003 and Porteus 2006).
Despite the recognition of the importance of regulations very few studies have
begun investigating the impact of mobile banking regulations on mobile banking
penetration. This is the central objective of this thesis. Through the utilization of
historical comparative analysis, this paper will trace the development of banking
regulations in Kenya and South Africa to try and contextualize why these countries have
followed different paths in developing mobile banking regulations.
2

Currently, Kenya has higher levels of mobile banking penetration with over 52%
of adults indicating that they own a mobile bank account, whilst in South Africa only
14% of adults indicate that they own a mobile bank account (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper
Singer and Van Oudheusden, 2015). This study will consider the significantly important
field distinctions between Kenya and South Africa in an attempt to understand the
different regulatory pathways that both countries have adopted. Applying Fligstein and
McAdams (2012) theory of fields broadly helps explains how different actors may have
influenced the development of regulations in South Africa and Kenya.
Previous studies have not directly examined whether there is an association
between mobile banking regulations and levels of mobile banking, therefore there is no
conclusive evidence to suggest that there an association between open mobile banking
regulations and mobile banking penetration. However, the consensus is that more open
mobile banking regulations do play an important role in encouraging private institutions
to invest in developing innovative banking solutions, including mobile banking (Lyman,
Pickens and Porteus 2008; Johnson and Arnold 2012). This research project, hopes to
contribute to identifying and conceptualizing different forms of regulatory developments
by examining the cases of Kenya and South Africa to better understand the significance
of regulatory processes in developing greater levels of financial inclusion.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Financial Inclusion
Access to financial services and institutions, on a global scale is unequally
distributed, however, the challenges that Africans face are unique (De Sousa 2010;
Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 2012). Financial inclusion broadly refers to having some
form of access to a financial institution, such as having access to a basic bank account,
regularly utilizing the account, having access to digital payments options, having access
to affordable credit providers, being able to save and developing financial literacy
(Collins 2008; Devlin 2005; Heyer and Mas 2009). A significant number of households
in developing countries lack access to financial services and this can impede economic
growth and development and access to basic financial services has been shown to reduce
poverty levels (Aker and Mbiti 2010; Kimenyi and Ndungu’u 2009; Sultana 2009). A
lack of access to formal financial services limits market exchanges, increases risk and
limits the opportunities to save (Kimenyi and Ndungu’u 2009). Trends indicate that
wealthier individuals who live urban areas and are male have greater access to financial
services, tools and literacy (Chibba 2009; Mbiti and Weil 2011).
In the same way that banks in developed countries have ignored low income and
uneducated individuals in poor neighborhoods in search for greater profits, banks in subSaharan Africa have ignored unemployed, poor and rural households and have instead
4

targeted wealthier and more affluent clients (McKay and Pickens 2010; Morse 2011).
Formal financial institutions have failed to tailor their products or services to meet the
needs to low-income households because the assumption is that these households do not
rely on complex methods and instruments to manage their finances (Collins 2008;
Kimenyi and Ndungu’u 2009). However, without access to formal financial services,
low-income households are forced to rely on informal services that are associated with
high costs (Kimenyi and Ndungu’u 2009).
Krippner (2005), Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin (2011), Lapavistas (2011) and
Orhangazi (2007) all illustrate that households in developed countries are interacting
with financial services and products at a higher rate than they used to in the past. At the
individual level van der Zwan (2014) illustrates that in the U.S. financial institutions
engage with consumers through a range of financial products and services such as
mortgages, mutual funds, student loans, car loans and insurance, and credit products. In
this environment it would be very difficult to function in a society where one does not
have access to financial institutions; an individual would unable to apply for credit, build
up savings, pay for the health insurance, have easy access to their money, or even be able
to safely transfer money for example.
De Sousa (2010) states that the expansion and focus of the financial inclusion
policy agenda ignores individual factors such as considering whether unbanked
individuals want to be banked at all. Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper (2012) add to this
perspective by stating that there is common assumption that those who do not use formal
financial services are somehow constrained from participating in the formal financial
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sector. Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper (2012) continue by emphasizing that there should be
a distinction between the desire for use and access.
These are valid observations; however, the choice to utilize financial services may
appear as though it has more to do with individual preference, such as choosing whether
or not to have a bank account or choosing to apply for a credit card. However, for
millions of people across the world, and specifically in Africa, being able to access
money safely, saving for the future, making money transfers, and being able to access
cash when it is necessary has more to do with the ability to access institutions that can
meet their financial needs (Mbiti and Weil 2011). Access to transport, unemployment,
and expensive bank fees are barriers to financial institution accessibility (Tchouassi
2012). Unbanked individuals essentially cannot afford to exist outside the dominant,
bank-led, financial system. From this perspective financial inclusion, the ability to have
access to financial institutions, should be viewed as a form of social justice
The consequences of being financially excluded are exacerbated when individuals
and households are increasingly interacting with financial markets to such an extent that
their ability to access resources is directly tied to their ability to interact and access
financial institutions. Van der Zwan (2014) states that the exponential growth of the
financial services sector is not only occurring in the U.S.; in Africa mobile phone
operators and banks which are looking for new markets are exposing consumers to a
wider array of financial instruments. This is where a critical perspective of the growth of
mobile banking is crucial. Mobile banking service providers have responded to an
existing need in developing countries with low access to formal financial institutions,
however, companies such as Safaricom in East Africa and MTN in West Africa are
6

driven by the same profit motives that have influenced banks. The fact that low income
consumers directly benefit from mobile banking, as will be illustrated later on, is
coincidental. In Kenya, through mobile banking product M-PESA, consumers are gaining
access to more financial products ranging from insurance to government bonds, as shown
in Table 1 below.
Table 1
Provider

Financial products available through mobile banking services
Service/Product

Credit Direct Kenya Limited
Cash advance over mobile
Equity Bank
M-Kesho savings account
Equity Bank
Personal accident insurance
Equity Bank
Loan over mobile
Kilimo Salama
Weather insurance (for farmers)
National Jua Kali Association
Mbale pension plan
M-Akiba
Kenyan government bonds
Sources: Data derived from McKay and Pickens (2010); Guguyu and Kuria (2015) and
The Financial Times (2015)
It is unclear what the long term effects of increased financialization in subSaharan Africa will be, but financialization forms part of the bigger financial inclusion
puzzle. However, the development of mobile banking services in sub-Saharan Africa has
proven that if there is an affordable, easily accessible financial service, individuals will
pay to utilize the service and this can contribute to increased levels of financial inclusion.
Mobile Banking and Financial Inclusion
Over the last decade, the growth of mobile banking has illustrated that it does
have the potential to allow millions of financially excluded Africans the opportunity to;
(1) break down the barriers associated with owning a bank account, (2) access services at
a much lower rate, (3) reduce their travel time to access a bank or an ATM, and (4) have
7

the ability to manage their finances from their mobile phone. However, where mobile
banking has been effective, in countries such as Brazil and Kenya, its development has
been supported by open regulations.
Supportive, open and accommodative banking regulations, such as those initiated
in Kenya, can be a meaningful policy-instrument that can increase the levels of financial
inclusion. By tracing the development of mobile banking in Kenya and South Africa, the
paper will highlight how both countries, for several reasons, started off with low levels of
mobile banking. However, within a space of ten years, Kenya’s mobile banking sector
growth has surpassed South Africa’s. This has led to high levels of mobile banking
penetration in Kenya, but very low levels in South Africa. The varying levels of mobile
banking penetration may seem inconsequential at the surface; however the case that this
research paper makes is that the development and implementation of distinctive banking
policies, sits at the crux of the differences between South Africa and Kenya. This paper
will make the case that South Africa has initiated banking regulations which favor the
market dominance of commercial banks to the detriment of other alternative financial
service providers, which ultimately disadvantages the position unbanked and
underbanked of South Africans.
This paper has chosen to focus on mobile banking as the alternative financial
service example because of the growth and impact that mobile phones have had in Africa
over the last decade, which places developing economies are at the forefront of redesigning what banking may look like in the future.
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Mobile Phones and Mobile Banking in sub-Saharan Africa
Africa was a late entrant in accessing mobile phone technology, only truly
beginning to utilize mobile phones in the early 2000s (Porteus 2006). However, this was
ultimately advantageous for Africans because consumers did not have to contend with the
early high costs associated with infrastructure and developing the technology (Rouvinen
2004). The relatively low cost of mobile phones and the continuous drop in prices has led
to mobile phones becoming relatively attainable for consumers from most income
brackets, especially those from the rising middle-class. Over 60% of Africans have access
to a mobile phone (Mbiti and Weil 2011). Fifteen years ago, there were only 15 million
mobile phones in Africa and by the end of 2014 it was forecast that there would be over
635 million mobile phone subscriptions in sub-Saharan Africa (Erricson 2014).
The growth of mobile phones has surpassed the growth of landlines, which are
expensive to install in African countries with little or no infrastructure; such as a lack of
roads, great distances between areas and low population densities (Aker and Mbiti 2010).
Mobile phones have been a “great equalizer”; the affordability of mobile phones and the
high levels of competition between mobile phone operators have contributed to reducing
costs and increasing mobile phone penetration (Porteus 2006; Rouvinen 2004). The
development, ease of access, and affordability of mobile phones has also allowed
numerous secondary functions such as providing entertainment, accessing medical search
engines through applications such as MedAfrica, and the development of mobile banking
(Aker and Mbiti 2010).
The rapid development of mobile banking services over the last decade in Africa
has highlighted how much traditional, brick and mortar; retail banks have ignored the
9

unbanked and low income consumers. It has also illustrated that there are alternative
ways to service overlooked consumers. In some African countries the mobile banking
revolution has displaced retail banks as the primary institutions responsible for executing
financial transactions (Lyman, Pickens and Porteus 2008). This is significant because
banks form an important part of the economic sector; banks usually drive important
policy directives and typically play a significant role in collecting deposits and providing
credit to individuals, businesses and governments.
What is Mobile Banking?
Broadly speaking mobile banking falls within the category of electronic banking
which refers to the ability to access financial services through the internet on PCs and
mobile phones, ATMs, and telephones (Lawack-Davids 2012). Mobile banking allows
phones to be transformed into a virtual bank card, a service terminal and an internet
banking terminal (Mas and Kumar 2008). Mobile banking in its simplest form allows
individuals to access basic financial services utilizing an application available on their
mobile phone. Mobile banking applications can either operate on WAP (requires internet
access) or WIG (utilizes SMS based commands) enabled mobile handsets (Porteus 2006).
Mobile banking can also operate utilizing Unstructured Supplementary Service Data
(USSD) which facilitates real time messaging between a mobile phone and bank servers
(Mas and Kumar 2008). Mobile phone operators can also develop applications that can be
built into the SIM card of a phone; this allows a user to have a unique virtual account
number (Tchouassi 2012). Debates have been raised about whether or not mobile banking
is an instrument that can be launched in vastly different countries, with unique financial
10

inclusion contexts. However, its potential to increase levels of financial inclusion, where
it has been successful, has been evident.
Regulations
Bank-led or Mobile Operator-led Regulation
Bank led regulations refers to mobile services which are primarily administrated
by banks and mobile operator-led refers to mobile banking services which are
administered by mobile network operators. Both banks and mobile network operators
have to work together to deliver mobile banking services, but there are significant
differences between bank-led and mobile-operator led services.
Regulators have not treated mobile banking as a wholly separate service that is
different to traditional banking (Klein and Mayer 2011). Klein and Mayer (2011) state
that the regulation of mobile banking, whether it is bank-led or mobile operator-led,
should consider risk in four basic areas; 1) the exchange of different forms of money, (2)
the storage of money for safe-keeping (3) the transfer of money from one owner to
another and (4) the investment of money. Bank-led mobile banking requires consumers to
have a contract with a prudentially regulated commercial bank, whilst mobile operatorled mobile banking consumers do not have a direct relationship with a bank (Lyman,
Pickens and Porteus 2008).
Bank-led mobile banking solutions often tend to be more additive and not
transformational; therefore, regulating the risk may not be as novel (Sultana 2009).
However, Tarazi and Breloff (2010) argue that this rudimentary distinction is less binary
and that ultimately both banks and mobile phone operators play a role in providing
mobile banking services. Tarazi and Berloff (2010) imagine that depending on the
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context of countries, mobile banking regulations exist on a continuous spectrum between
bank-led and mobile operator-led hybrid models.
The most pressing regulatory issue of exchanging different forms of money is that
the value of e-money needs to be in the same units and value of real (i.e. physical) cash,
and different providers cannot issue different currencies (Aker and Mbiti 2010; Klein and
Mayer 2011). Users of mobile banking deposit real cash through a physical mobile
banking platform merchant; this is then converted into e-money and is measured in the
same units as real money. E-money operates on the same principles in other regions
across Asia and Latin America and Africa (Aker and Mbiti 2010; Demombynes and
Thegeya 2012; Jack and Suri 2011). Withdrawals of e-money (sometimes called mmoney for mobile money) are then also made in cash (Lawack-Davids 2012). Mobile
banking providers also cannot issue their own currency (Klein and Mayer 2011).
Secondly, unique account identifiers are required for storing account information and
transaction data so that customers can track their own account activity (Klein and Mayer
2011).
Third, considerations need to be made about the effect of cross-border money
transfers as well as the fact that in some instances banks are not involved in the money
clearing process which makes instant transaction possible (Klein and Mayer 2011).
Cross-border transfers have developed in Africa between East and Central Africa, in
Brazil and India therefore exchange-risk issues do exist (Wexler 2015).
Some mobile phone operators store the transfer money in a “float”, which is not
invested and does not accrue interest, which decreases the need for regulatory for
oversight (Dias and McKee 2010; Klein and Mayer 2011). The float operates as a cash
12

reserve of sorts (Tarazi and Breloff 2010). Commercial banks are required to provide to
maintain some level of liquidity, non-banks; particularly MNO’s do not have that
requirement. This extra step of having a float is sometimes required to separate e-money
funds from the actual profits in order to reduce cases of fraud (Dias and McKee 2010).
These funds in the float are stored in prudentially regulated banks and doing this does not
protect consumers from the risk association with bank failure, especially in countries
where depositors insurance is not provided (Klein and Mayer 2011; Tarazi and Breloff
2010).
Fraud, money laundering and terrorist financing are significant global political
issues as well (Dias and McKee 2010; Lyman, Pickens and Porteus 2008; Vleck 2011).
Some countries with developed mobile banking services have developed fraud, antimoney laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CTF) regulations, however,
the finances to supervise compliance with local and international standards may not exist
(Vleck 2011). Dias and McKee (2010) also stress that consumer protections regulations
that allow consumers to complain and access redress are crucial but underdeveloped.
Kenya and South Africa represent divergent mobile banking regulatory positions,
even though both governments have committed to increasing financial inclusion. Both
countries have passed regulations that allow mobile operators to function in the market;
however Kenya’s laws have created a loophole that has allowed mobile banking to
develop from a mobile operator-led position, whilst South Africa has opted for a bank
led-model.
Ashta (2010) states that countries that develop a mobile operator-led or bank-led
approach to mobile banking are influenced by their aversion to risk. Countries with a
13

higher percentage of banked individuals will be prone to loss aversion, and legislation
will be formulated to constrain the development of mobile banking, making it tightly
regulated (Ashta 2010). South Africa, with its relatively advanced financial infrastructure
levels, according to Ashta’s (2010) theorizing, has taken a conservative approach because
it has more to lose by developing a mobile operator-led model which effectively has
lower levels of regulatory oversight. However, contending that institutions in Kenya have
less to lose because of lower risk aversion disregards the very deliberate policy measures
that Kenya took to ensure the development of transformational mobile banking services.
By conducting a comparative policy analysis between South Africa and Kenya, my paper
will investigate what the main policy differences are and how these affect the
development of mobile banking.
The development of mobile banking brings to the forefront questions about how
banking has been defined in the past and how traditional banking services can in fact be
unbundled in order to respond to the needs of those who are financially excluded (Klein
and Mayer 2011). When services become unbundled a clear distinction needs to made as
to what exactly payments and deposits are (Klein and Mayer 2011). Regulation needs to
be proportional and effective and recognize the balance between innovation, consumer
protection and fostering financial access (Dias and McKee 2010; Lyman, Pickens and
Porteus 2008). Proportional regulation refers to implementing regulations that are
proportionate to the benefits that result from the service being offered and this often
results in focus being placed on regulating the risks associated with use (Lyman, Pickens
and Porteus 2008). Regulation can also change as the market matures and more mobile
banking competitors enter the market (Dias and McKee 2010).
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Tarazi and Breloff (2010) state that mobile operator-led mobile banking services,
may not be subject to the same stringent regulations that banks are required to adhere to,
however, simultaneously mobile operators are actively prohibited, in some countries,
from taking deposits directly, even if it is for payments and not savings, as regulators
reason that public deposit taking should be reserved for banks which are prudentially
regulated institutions. Another contentious subject is deciding which institution should
oversee regulation when mobile banking services are provided by both banks and mobile
operators is exactly (Klein and Mayer 2011).
Ashta (2010) states that the risks inherent in banking can be segmented into three
parts; (1) the risk for the bank, (2) the risks for bank clients and (3) the risk for the
economy. Risks for banks can vary from liquidity issues, over-extending credit,
operational risks, foreign exchange risks, and interest rate risks (Ashta 2010). Client risks
include fraud, bank solvency and risks associated with increased bank credit extension
(Ashta 2010). Economic risks entail potential financial crises, money laundering, and
bank inefficiencies (Ashta 2010). Risks associated with mobile network operators is that
mobile phone operators take on significant costs in developing and maintaining
infrastructure and for customers (Ashta 2010; Lyman, Pickens and Porteus 2008).
There are other complex issues that are brought to the surface when financial
services and the telecommunications sector provide mobile banking services. The main
issues that are raised with regard to the development of mobile banking are: (1) e-money
issuance, (2) what qualifies as payments or transfers, and (3) which institutions are
legally permitted to accept deposits from the public.

15

Categories of Banking Regulation which Apply to Mobile Banking
Two broad categories of regulation are considered in relation to mobile banking.
Business conduct regulation refers to consumer protection, and anti-money laundering
policies. Examples of this could include the South African National Credit Act (2002) as
well as the Financial Action Task Force led by the United States through the G7 in 1989
(Klein and Mayer 2011; Vleck 2011). The second category refers to prudential regulation
which concerns the implementation of rules governing to liquidity, risk behavior and
capital requirements of financial institutions (Klein and Mayer 2011).
Prudential regulation is typically introduced in order to reduce risk from parties
involved in providing mobile banking as well as protecting consumers from the
possibility of future failure (Ashta 2010; Klein and Mayer 2011). As mobile operators do
not grant credit, risk is reduced. However, regulations that protect banks and their clients
from the risk of banks going bankrupt do not apply to telecoms institutions (Klein and
Mayer 2011). The balancing act for regulators then is to ensure that is established
proportional regulation that encourages the development of mobile banking whilst also
supervising against the risks and those affected by the risk (Ashta 2010).
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CASE SELECTION

Kenya and South Africa may not seem like obvious choices for a historical case
comparison and when mobile banking services were launched in 2004 and 2007 for
South Africa and Kenya respectively, both countries had significant differences. See table
2, below.
Table 2

The Mobile Banking Arena: Kenya and South Africa Key Differences
Kenya

South Africa

Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people)

13

70

Adults with a bank accounts

10%

45%

Adults using mobile banking

-

~3%

2005

ATMs (per 100 000)

1.58

24.94

GDP per capita ($US Dollars)

523.6

5444.1

Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people)

74

150

Adults with bank accounts

75%

70%

ATMs (per 100 000)

9.99

61.88

GDP per capita (US Dollars)

1,333.9

6,477.9

Adults with a mobile account

58%

14%

Adults utilizing mobile banking

74.7%

17.5%

2014

Sources: Data retrieved from World Bank 2014 Findex Report and the South Africa 2014
Finscope Report
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It is important to point out that the table above indicates that South Africa had
about ~3% of mobile banking penetration levels in 2005; these figures refer specifically
to mobile banking as an additive solution. An additive banking solution is one that is tied
to a bank account at a financial institution (Porteus 2006). The form of mobile banking
that is of interest here is one where the mobile bank account is not tied to a financial
institution and that is transformational mobile banking (Porteus 2006; Porteus 2007).
Mahoney (2000) states that comparing cases where an outcome is present and
cases where it is not present is useful to strengthening the explanation for a particular
outcome. The outcome examined here is mobile banking penetration, which is higher in
Kenya than in South Africa. When mobile banking was launched in both countries,
transformational mobile banking (henceforth referred to as just mobile banking) solutions
were non-existent. In both countries the potential for launching mobile banking was not
predetermined and banking policies in Kenya and South Africa at the time, did not have
any specifications for addressing mobile banking. However, when mobile banking
solutions were launched in both countries the regulatory response was vastly different
and it is that process that this research project seeks to understand. Therefore, even
though both Kenya and South Africa had varying levels of access to bank accounts for
instance, the focus here will be placed on how regulations associated with mobile
banking developed. However, in the section covering preliminary evidence, issues
relating to these differences will be addressed as they cannot be ruled out the broader
narrative of financial inclusion.
The open regulatory development process which has developed in Kenya is
unique and recent indications point that no other country in sub-Saharan Africa has
18

developed a similar regulatory framework (Collins 2011). Therefore, using Kenya as a
case to indicate what open mobile banking regulations look like is useful. Selecting South
Africa is partly influenced by early research that had indicated that South Africa would
be an early adopter of mobile banking solutions because of high levels of mobile phone
penetration and unusually high levels of access to banking infrastructure such as bank
branches and ATMs, compared to other African countries (Brown et al. 2003; Porteus
2006). However, this did not occur in South Africa. In fact, in 2010, a mobile banking
service that was significantly successful in Kenya was replicated in South Africa;
however it failed to attract a significant user base (Tarrant 2015).
Both Kenya and South Africa are economic leaders in their respective regions on
the continent, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for South Africa
and East African Community (EAC) for Kenya and as result of that, both countries have
played influential roles in shaping banking sectors and policies in these regions. In South
Africa, this influence can be traced back to the colonial expansion period when
Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho all formed part of the British High
Commission Territories (Mogalakwe 2006; Spence 1964). These countries adopted a
similar banking system to South Africa and currently, the largest banks in South Africa;
also have a significant presence in these neighboring countries (Ndzamela 2012). In
Kenya, this has occurred through the development of mobile banking, a few Kenyan
mobile network operators (MNOs) have branched out to neighboring countries such as
Uganda and Tanzania and Kenyan mobile operators have developed partnerships with
their counterparts in neighboring countries in order to make cross-border mobile banking
transactions possible (Wexler 2015). Therefore, the policy decisions that both Kenya and
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South Africa follow may influence their regional counterparts, so including both
countries as comparison cases can be useful in future comparative studies that include
more cases.
This research project includes two comparison cases, however, the objective with
case comparison with a small N is not to establish causation through comparison and
extend those generalizations to other countries (Bennet and Elman 2006). The objective
is to trace a particular set of processes that occurred in Kenya that did not occur in South
Africa and to understand those unique circumstances. Ragin (2008) states that conducting
comparative studies requires deep knowledge of specific cases and this is what this
research paper is attempting to do by including these two cases. Other methodological
issues relating to case selection will be addressed in the methods section.
The South African Case: Lower Levels of Mobile Banking Penetration
As of 2014, 25% of adults in South Africa indicated that they did not have access
to any formal financial institution and only 14% of South Africans indicated that they
utilized their mobile phone to access mobile banking services in 2014 (Finscope 2014;
World Bank Findex 2014). The figures of mobile banking usage are surprising
considering that South Africa has very high levels of mobile phone penetration (see Table
2), and was one of the earliest pioneers of mobile banking services (Porteus 2006; GMSA
2014). The low levels of mobile penetration are also further highlighted when compared
to Tanzania, for instance where 32% of individuals have a mobile bank account but the
country has a GDP per capita of just over US$900, where South Africa’s stands at just
over US$6,600 (World Bank 2014; World Bank Findex 2014). Other countries with
higher levels of mobile banking such as Kenya, Brazil and India, had significantly lower
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levels of financial infrastructure compared to South Africa when mobile banking services
were launched but they have also surpassed South Africa’s levels of mobile banking
penetration.
Ten years ago, 45% of adults in South Africa indicated that they had a bank
account and there were just fewer than 25 ATMs per 100,000 people (World Bank
Findex 2014). South Africa also had more developed networks that provided consumers
access to EFT Point of Service machines, electronic-transaction terminals commonly
found at cash registers commonly used in retail stores that allow customers to swipe their
debit or credit card to make a payment and various other kinds of financial services (Aker
and Mbiti 2010; Porteus 2006). Due to this, an argument has been put forward that South
Africa’s low use of mobile banking is because that demand is being met by other types of
financial services and products. Below is a list of the few alternative financial products
and services which are available in South Africa;
1. Additive Mobile banking platforms: The big four banks Standard Bank,
First National Bank (FNB), Absa and Nedbank (including the challenger
Capitec) all have their own versions of WAP, WIG and USSD enabled
mobile banking services. Some commercial banks have also individually
partnered with various mobile operators to provide mobile banking.
2. FNB e-Wallet: FNB has taken a step further by offering e-Wallet services
to its customers in 2009. The e-Wallet allows FNB customers to transfer
funds from their mobile phone to virtual accounts; those funds are then
cashed at an FNB ATM across the country (Phakathi 2013).
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3. Shoprite’s MoneyMarket counter: In 2008, the country’s largest retailer
launched its MoneyMarket counter which allows individuals to transfer
funds and withdraw their cash from any other Shoprite store in the
country. This service effectively provides individuals who do not have
access to a bank account the ability to transfer and receive funds
immediately.
4. PiknPay GoBanking: Following in the footsteps on Shoprite, PiknPay
has attempted to replicate the success of Shoprite MoneyMarket services
and has added supplementary services such as access to a credit card, a
savings account and a debit card to its offering by partnering with
Nedbank.
5. SASSA social grant bank card: In 2013 the South African Social
Security Agency partnered with MasterCard to deliver social welfare
payments utilizing a biometric debit card. This allowed millions of social
welfare recipients who had previously never had a basic bank account to
access one. Nearly 10 million South African’s receive some form of social
welfare; therefore even though the new system was primarily created to
curtail fraud, after 2013 millions of previously unbanked individuals
became banked.
6. The Mzansi Account: Through a provision included in the 2004 Financial
Sector Charter South Africans banks were tasked with extending bank
accounts to low income customers by establishing Mzansi Accounts
(Kirsten 2006). Mzansi accounts offer basic services such as deposits,
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withdrawals, local transfers, and debit card payments at a fraction of the
cost than what a traditional checking account would offer (Ssewamala,
Sperber, Zimmerman and Karimli 2010). By 2007 around 2 million South
Africans had opened up an Mzansi account (Porteus 2006).
All of the services listed above do constitute some form of financial inclusion. But
most of these services and products are struggling to reach unbanked South African. The
services presented above revolve around commercial banks which reinforce their market
dominance and centrality within the financial services market. It is also important to
highlight that a significant portion of figures and data published about South Africa’s
unbanked ignore the fact that there is also still large portion of South Africans who are
also underbanked. The underbanked do fully utilize the financial products or services that
they have access to for similar reasons that many South African are unbanked in the first
place; the services are frequently inaccessible, expensive or there is a real lack of
knowledge (financial literacy) about how to utilize different financial instruments.
Therefore the alternative financial services listed above operate on the same or related
limitations that banks operate under.
The products listed above cannot be described as transformational banking
services. Porteus (2006) states that in order to have ‘true’ financial inclusion, banking
services that are intended to increase financial inclusion need to be transformative and
not additive. Porteus (2006: 3) defines transformative banking services as services that
(1) utilize existing mobile communications infrastructure, (2) are driven by new players
which have higher incentives to target non-traditional markets, (3) include services that
build on the new distribution networks for cash transactions, and move beyond the
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conventional merchant or ATM networks of banks and includes services that are
considerably affordable compared to formal banks. Some of the alternative options listed
above do have these characteristics but many of them do not.
Mobile banking services provided by the big four banks are usually an additional
service offered to an existing customer base. The product itself is still inaccessible to
consumers who otherwise would not be utilizing an actual bank account. The FNB eWallet is unique in its design and its attempt to encourage unbanked customers to interact
with a banking institution. However, the e-Wallet service still relies on individuals being
able to travel to access an ATM. The e-Wallet may be more accessible to individuals
residing in urban areas but for individuals in isolated areas, the expense of traveling to
withdraw cash may outweigh the benefits of having funds being immediately available.
Banks are not developing a strategy with a strong cash-in/cash-out network that is easily
accessible (Mas and Kumar 2008).
The Shoprite MoneyMarket service is exceptional because it does have a growing
cash-in/cash-out network, cash can be deposited or withdrawn at any Shoprite retail store.
The Shoprite MoneyMarket service relies on Shoprite’s retail network and it has 13241
retail outlets across South Africa. Shoprite was one of the first retailers to expand into
townships (historically black segregated neighborhoods) and rural areas after South
Africa’s first democratic election in 1994 and this has given the retailer a first-mover
advantage. Since 2008 over fifty percent of Shoprite consumers (approximately 10
million customers) have utilized the MoneyMarket service (Shoprite 2014). However,
Shoprite may have a wider footprint, but Shoprite’s retail stores are located in densely
1

2014 figures

24

populated and relatively higher income areas. Therefore, Shoprite has the same limitation
that ATMs and bank branches have and that is accessibility
SASSA is the government agency responsible for distributing welfare grants,
utilizing bank accounts to distribute funds does allow more individuals to have access to
a bank account. South Africa’s percentage of banked individuals jumped up significantly
after SASSA recipients were signed up, moving from 64% in 2009 to 75% in 2014, but
these figures may have been superficially boosted, especially if those banks accounts are
underused. Collins (2008), who monitored how low-income households in South Africa
managed their finances, found that individuals would often withdraw their entire monthly
salary or weekly wage and social grant from their bank account. The reasons for doing
this include avoiding overdraft charges or debit orders (Collins 2008). The 2011 Findex
report also found that in developing economies 10% of adults with an account maintain
inactive accounts meaning that they did not make withdrawals or deposits within a month
(Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 2012). Mzansi accounts present similar inactivity
challenges. In 2011 over four million Mzansi accounts had been opened, which is
significant, however, many of the accounts actually had remained inactive because
individuals would withdraw a single lump sum monthly and never used the account until
the following month (Bångens & Söderberg, 2008; Tchouassi 2012).
Therefore, the position that the low levels of mobile banking are due to the lack of
demand for low-cost services is questionable. That position can be further challenged by
the success of Capitec. Capitec is a low cost commercial bank which has positioned itself
as a challenger to the big four commercial banks in South Africa (Theobald 2013).
Capitec, in South Africa, is currently the only bank that markets itself as a bank that is
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actively reducing its transaction fees to attract low income consumers. Capitec has lower
operational costs, has fewer branches nationally and focuses on transferring banking
services (such as deposits) to self-service ATMs (Theobald 2013). This strategy has
worked for Capitec, which in 2013 surpassed Nedbank to be the fourth largest retail bank
(by market share) in South Africa (Business Tech 2013). However, it is significant to
note that Capitec has hinged its success on the growth of its small, high interest loans
(Theobald 2013). Capitec’s growth in attracting transactional account clients does
indicate that there is a demand for low cost banking services, which could include mobile
banking.
The Kenyan Case: Higher Levels of Mobile Banking Penetration
Financial Services in Kenya range from formal commercial banking, savings and
credit co-operatives (SACCOs), microfinance institutions and credit associations and
informal services such as lending circles and local shops which provide grocery credit
(Johnson and Arnold 2012). Before the advent of mobile banking millions of Kenyans
relied on informal and expensive (Western Union/MoneyGram) methods to transfer
money and informal methods of transferring money included this included relying on the
post office, bus company terminals which offered transfer services and taxi drivers who
operated as money delivery men (Aker and Mbiti 2010). A significant portion of the
Kenyan population did not have access to a bank account or a savings account because
formal banking is expensive and access to credit is skewed towards public and private
enterprises in urban areas (Aker and Mbiti 2010; Beck, Cull, Fuchs, Getenga, Gatere,
Randa, and Trandafir 2010; Mbiti and Weil 2011).
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The low level of bank account penetration can be partly explained by historical
bank failures, high market segmentation and the influence of politics, race and ethnicity
within the banking system. The low levels of trust in Kenya’s banking system have also
been attributed to the numerous bank failures and the most recent bank failures in Kenya
occurred in the periods between 1993 and 1995, 1998 and 2000 through to 2005
(Upadhyaya 2011).
Banks in Kenya currently can be separated into four categories; (1) foreign owned
banks, (2) government owned banks, (3) large private owned banks and (4) small private
owned banks (Upadhyaya 2011). Foreign banks, with historical and colonial ties to
British trading companies have a reputation of being considered safe but expensive and
currently have over 40% of market share (Mang’unyi 2011; Upadhyaya 2011).
Government banks were formed shorty after independence in Kenya, in 1963, to respond
to the needs of Kenyan’s who were excluded from the formal banking system during
British colonial rule (Updhyaya 2011). Over half of the government banks are located in
rural and semi-rural areas in Kenya, however, government banks have a reputation of
being inefficient (Beck et al. 2010; Mang’unyi 2011). The poor perception of government
banks in Kenya is also related to the political scandals that have identified that
government banks grant loans to board members with political ties (Dafe 2012;
Updhayaya 2011).
Elements that further complicate the Kenyan banking system are issues of race
and ethnicity which are closely tied to issues of access. Asian-Africans (fourth and fifth
generation Indian and Pakistan Kenyans) hold the majority of ownership of local private
banks and private African owned banks are often made up of Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Kamba
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and Kisii ethnic groups which do have political and capital ties to the state. All of this has
led to increased levels of mistrust of commercial banks in Kenya and low levels of
financial inclusion (Beck et al. 2010). Mbiti and Weil (2011) state that this lack of trust in
commercial banks could possibly explain why during the 2008 post-election violence
urban residents opted to access their money through mobile money transactions as
opposed to commercial banks. The violence which erupted in urban areas resulted in
violent frictions between various ethnic groups (Mbiti and Weil 2011).
Transformational Banking Services: M-PESA
Unlike South Africa, Kenya, through the development of mobile banking, took a
different pathway to increasing levels financial inclusion. In 2005, M-PESA was
launched as a pilot project to find ways to assist microloan lenders who needed to
communicate with their customers. After the success of the pilot project and the evidence
of demand for a formal product, M-PESA was relaunched in 2007 as a mobile banking
application (Mbiti and Weil 2011). When M-PESA was officially relaunched it achieved
a high rate of sign up numbers and currently M-PESA has over 20 million customers in
Kenya and over 23% of Kenyans indicate that they utilize mobile banking services at
least once a day (Demboynes and Thegeya 2012; Heyer and Mas 2009; Tshabalala 2015).
Since its inception M-PESA has cumulatively transferred over US$3.7 billion, which
represents almost 10% of Kenya’s annual GDP (Aker and Mbit 2010; Tshabalala 2015).
Daily, US$1.96 million is transferred through M-PESA, mostly in small amounts
averaging about US$20 per transaction (Heyer and Mas 2009).
M-PESA operates as an application that allows users to utilize their phone as a
bank account. Users can transfer money and send payments from their phone and
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withdraw cash from M-PESA agents that are located across Kenya (Heyer and Mas 2009;
Mas and Morawczynski 2009). M-PESA operates through agents who can be thought of
as cash merchants (Heyer and Mas 2009). M-PESA agents across Kenya can set up shop
anywhere; at busy public transport intersections, informal settlement outlets, and corner
stores and Safaricom has made special concessions for cash agents who are located in
remote areas (Safaricom 2014). M-PESA agents are often in close proximity to people
and in Kenya agents can be found every few hundred meters (Klein and Mayer 2011).
This strategy of making M-PESA agents being easily accessible is similar to how mobile
phone minutes are sold in Africa. MNOs have invested heavily in developing these
networks; it is fairly easy to access mobile minutes from a local corner store, kiosks at
public markets and individual mobile minute resellers (Ivantury and Mas 2008).
Unlike banks which are concentrated in urban areas, M-PESA agents are spread
out to informal settlements and remote rural areas and operate as store fronts that make it
possible for individuals to easily access their funds (Heyer and Mas 2009; Mbiti and Weil
2011). In Kenya M-PESA has evolved to include insurance payments, investment
payments, regional-cross border and international remittances as well savings options
(Wexler 2015). The success of M-PESA has prompted other mobile operators in Kenya
to provide mobile banking services. These are not yet as prolific as Safaricom’s MPESA; however, as the Central Bank of Kenya is introducing new regulations to reduce
the dominance of Safaricom, alternative service providers may begin to see their share of
the market increasing.
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The South African and Kenyan regulatory environments as strategic action fields
Applying Fligstein and McAdams (2012) theory of fields to the regulatory
environments that Kenya and South Africa operate in can assist in illustrating which
actors have the most influence on the development regulations. Fligstein and McAdam
(2012) are interested in how social actors engage in action, utilize their resources and
capabilities to influence social change within a given strategic action field. The actors
within the regulatory environments in Kenya and South Africa include commercial
banks, non-banks, and regulatory institutions as well external actors such as both national
governments as well global institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and the United
Nations which inform the development of the financial inclusion development agenda.
Fligstein and McAdams (2011) theory of fields is primarily concerned with
explaining how social change occurs and how social actors engage in action, utilize their
resources and capabilities to influence social change within a given strategic action field.
According to Fligstein and McAdam (2012) a strategic action field is a meso-level social
order where different actors set the norms, values, beliefs, rules, and power differentials
within a particular space. Strategic action fields can be as large as an industry or as small
as a department within an organization (Fligstein and McAdam 2011).
Within these fields different actors have varying levels of power. Incumbents
have the most influence within a field because of their access to resources such as
personnel and money. Incumbents are actors “who wield disproportionate influence
within a field and whose interests and views tend to be heavily reflected” (Fligstein and
McAdam 2012: 13). Incumbents also influence the development of institutional logics
which the shared understandings that different actors within a field hold (Fligstein and
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McAdam 2012). This includes the shared understandings of what is going on within a
particular field, and who has power as well as the rules of a field.
Incumbents promote the status quo that favors their interests and highlights their
privileged position. In South Africa, the incumbents are the commercial banks who have
a significant share of the market, resources as well influencing government policy. In
Kenya, the field is much more open and the position of commercial banks is not
centralized and because of this power is more diffused. The non-banks who provide
banking services in Kenya according to Fligstein and McAdam (2012) can be seen as the
challengers. Challengers occupy less privileged positions within a field and that
challengers are more invested in finding ways to increase their power.
Commercial banks is South Africa have their position centralized and this
increases their legitimacy within the field whilst commercial banks in Kenya do not have
the same legitimacy because so many consumers can also access banking services
provided by non-banks. For example in Kenya, M-Pesa was launched in 2007 and now
has over 20 million users across East and West Africa (Mas and Morawczynski 2009).
Within eight months of its launch M-Pesa had over 8 million users and US$87 million
had been transferred utilizing M-Pesa (Mbiti and Weil 2011). Therefore, non-banks have
as legitimacy as banks and even though banks are attempting to change this, this research
hopes to illustrate that the Kenyan regulatory field is not as cemented as the South Africa
field and is therefore much more susceptible to changes. In South Africa, new regulations
that are introduced continue to centralize the position of banks, and this will be illustrated
in the findings sections, whilst in Kenya, the Central Bank has allowed the rules within
the field to be driven by consumer demands instead. This means that the Kenyan
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environment is much more reflexive and any future changes within the financial inclusion
space will most likely develop from new disruptive technologies that move away from
traditional ‘brick and mortar’ types of banking (Heyer and Mas 2009).
The Kenyan and South African mobile banking environment represent significant
changes occurring within banking sectors in the global south where mobile banking is
most advanced. Therefore, part of this study hopes to add context to what are the
significant factors which affect the development of mobile banking regulations as well
some contextual differences. The theory of fields by Fligstein and McAdam (2012) can
be applied to understand who the different actors are as well their role and position within
the broader field. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) theory is applied to understand what
drives social change and the inability to access financial services has held back
significant part of the population within the global South. The development of mobile
banking represents the opportunity to introduce a product that can act as a great equalizer
in increasing access to financial services.
However, this hinges on whether the development of mobile banking regulations
can positively influence those who have been excluded from accessing those services.
This paper, through the conceptualization of an open and closed regulatory environment
proposes to regulatory possibilities and illustrates how they impact the delivery of mobile
banking services and considers how the role of incumbents is both contexts shapes the
regulatory environment.
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METHODOLOGY

Research Questions
In this section, I focus on four main research questions:
1. What are the regulations that directly affect mobile banking in Kenya and
South Africa?
2. Are there any significant regulatory differences between Kenya and South
Africa and how do these differences impact the implementation of mobile
banking services?
3. Are there any other contextual factors that could explain the different
levels of mobile banking in Kenya and South Africa?
These questions are presented here to guide the research process and to provide
some form of structure in how I choose to approach the analysis. This is particularly
significant because the methodology is not typically straightforward. I have deliberately
kept the questions as broad as possible to allow me the researcher some flexibility in how
I choose to answer them. This research is unique because it is attempting to examine and
understand the regulatory space of mobile banking holistically as opposed to studying
only a single subset of regulations.
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Analytical Strategy
This objective of this research project is to examine how South Africa and Kenya
developed different forms of mobile banking regulations which have partly shaped the
varying levels of the mobile banking penetration in both countries. When utilizing a
historical comparative approach, it is suggested that utilizing multiple strategies will
assist in achieving solid theory building and particular historical explanations (Armstrong
and Crage 2006; Mahoney 2004). Therefore, this research illustrates that by conducting a
brief historical analysis of the development of mobile banking regulation in Kenya and
South Africa, a more complex understanding of the regulatory environment can be
understood.
The basic strategy of the case-oriented approach is to identify the similarities and
differences between the cases, and link the variables of interest to the specific outcome
(Ragin 1987). In order to establish whether there are similarities and differences between
Kenya and South Africa, I utilized the method of direct and indirect differences
(necessary and sufficient causes). Necessary causes refer to causes (in this case
regulations) that allow the outcome to be possible in the first place, without their
presence the outcome cannot occur, basically “Y only if X” (Mahoney 2004; Mahoney,
Kimball, and Koivu 2009). However, at the same time the presence of X does not
necessarily result in the observed outcome and this is significant because historical
comparative analysis assumes that numerous outcomes are possible within a given
context (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009). Therefore, the observed outcome is not a
guarantee, even though its occurrence is dependent on a necessary cause (Mahoney
2004). Sufficient causes, on the other hand, refer to causes that are sufficient but not
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necessary for an outcome to occur, “if X then Y” (Mahoney 2004). Sufficient causes by
themselves do not lead to a particular outcome but are sufficient for that outcome to
occur. For example, the sun is sufficient for crops to grow, however, without water or
nutrients in the soil, even with the presence of the sun, the crops will not grow.
Conceptualization
Based on the brief analysis in chapter 6 the concepts that are discussed here are
brief outlines of what the final analysis will include.
As stated in the introduction, I am interested in examining how different kinds of
regulations affect the development of mobile banking. Preliminary analysis indicates that
Kenya has more open regulations which have made it simpler for consumers to access
mobile banking services. In South Africa regulations reinforce the centrality of banks and
this has affected how mobile banking services are implemented. Below I make a
distinction between open and closed regulations.
Open regulations
Open regulations are regulations that do not impose the strict prudential
regulation of mobile banking service providers. These regulations are introduced with the
intention of making it simpler for mobile banking service providers to design products
and services that will be accessible to those who are financially excluded. These
regulations typically entail fewer bureaucratic processes, more lenient prudential
oversight and sometimes oversight lies outside of central banks.
Open regulations can be driven by both public and private sector interests. Open
regulations also typically develop in environments where banking services and
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infrastructure has been previously limited and new technologies are entering the same
market and competing for consumers. In this scenario, current banking regulations may
not apply to novel services which fall outside of the prudential regulation of central banks
for instance.
Closed regulations
These are regulations that follow a more conservative regulatory approach and
they centralize the importance of commercial banks. This is done through introducing
regulations that make it more challenging to set-up mobile banking services and ensures
that key processes are administrated by banks as opposed as non-banks. These
regulations are also characterized with more complex and comprehensive bureaucratic
processes. As these regulations centralize the position of banks in the mobile banking
payments and transfers space, regulations are stricter. The regulation of mobile banking
services also falls only within the purview of the central bank.
Closed regulations can be driven by both public and private sector interests and
sometimes closed regulations also often align with international standards, practices or
guidelines. For instance, in relation to mobile banking regulations, there is a strong push
to define banking best practices according to standards set out by the BASEL III
regulations, which are prudential regulatory guidelines which apply at the country level
but are set up by international interests. A significant majority of the BASEL Committee
members are from western countries.
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Unit of Analysis
Historical comparative methodologies do not typically reference units of analysis
in the way that quantitative research do. However, for purposes of clarity, I specify in this
section that the units of analysis here are regulations that influence mobile banking. This
is because this research is concerned with how the different types of regulations result in
varying outcomes of mobile banking penetration. This paper considers the kinds of
regulations which impact mobile banking at the institutional (i.e. banks) as well as the
individual level. Many of the regulations that are examined here are largely focused on
institutions and not individuals.
Operationalization
The regulations that directly impact mobile banking fall into various government
acts, provisions, stipulations and positions documents. For the purposes of this study I
have identified six broad regulatory characteristics of mobile banking, as seen in the
findings chapter. This approach is more deductive, however it is informed by the close
reading of previous studies, research papers and industry reports that consistently
highlight these characteristics within regulations as hampering or facilitating the
development of mobile banking regulations. The regulations which will are identified fall
into one or a number of these categories.
Hypotheses
Having addressed the individual questions listed above, these are broad
hypotheses that I address in my findings.
1. Open regulations encourage the development of high mobile banking
penetration.
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This is based on the assumption that open regulations encourage mobile service
providers, who are typically not banks, to develop services and that open regulations,
such as looser KYC regulations make it simpler for consumers to open up a mobile
banking account. All of these conditions would lead to higher levels of mobile banking
use.
2. Bank-led mobile banking services are not conducive for developing high
levels of mobile banking penetration.
This hypothesis is meant to address the assumption that certain kinds of
institutions make it possible to develop mobile banking services that appeal to a wider
consumer base, therefore increasing levels of financial inclusion. Banks, with defined
profit motives, are not incentivized to develop products which encourage mobile banking
for the masses. Therefore, regulations that centralize banking intuitions, as opposed to
mobile network operators for example, develop regulations that are more closed because
banks are typically more tightly regulated.
Data
I have relied solely on secondary data sources which revealed what factors were
significant in shaping the development of regulatory policies. This is significant because
the objective of this paper is theory building. South Africa and Kenya serve as two
extreme case examples which I am utilizing to build an argument.
The period of analysis that I have focused on here are the years between 2004 and
2007. This is because these years are part of the formative period when mobile banking
was developing and there were no clear guidelines or international cases that could be
used as templates for comparison. Since then the mobile banking regulatory space,
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though still rapidly developing, has managed to create regulator standards and as mobile
technology improves, the regulations are slowly caching up to the new changes.
Academic sources
As I am interested in specific regulations so I have included academic papers that
have studied the effects of particular regulations on mobile banking. This is a useful
approach to studying regulations as these papers provide crucial information about why
certain regulations are significant and they also provide more detail about how separate
regulations actually influence the implementation of mobile banking. Even though a
weakness of including these studies is that I am relying on a secondary interpretation of a
primary source. These sources expand beyond the years of interest as certain regulations
were passed before mobile banking services were launched in both countries.
For purposes of coherence, I have included banking laws that were introduced
after the liberalization of banking sectors in Kenya and South Africa, in Kenya this was
in 1990 and in South Africa; this occurred during the post 1994 period. This is significant
because both countries adopted a neo-liberal outlook that promoted limiting the role of
the government, opening up to global capital markets, attracting foreign direct investment
and increasing competition with the banking sectors (Upadhyaya 2011). It is a point of
departure that is logical in terms of tracing regulations that impact banking and mobile
banking currently. This is one of the limitations of historical comparative analysis,
deciding which junctures in history are significant and which are not because ultimately,
the objective with this research is not to simply conclude that history matters but rather to
identify specific points in that history.
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Industry Reports
Industry reports that I have looked at in this study include those compiled for the
banking sector as well as the telecommunications sectors in both Kenya and South
Africa. Industry reports are mainly compiled by associations with close links to the
sectors or are privately funded organizations that conduct research in the sector. These
include the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor under the umbrella of the World Bank,
the GSM Association which represents the interests of mobile operators globally, for
example. These reports also included studies conducted by consultancies such as Deloitte
and McKinsey & Co.
These reports are typically conducted on behalf of clients and are useful in
assessing the changes and trends that occur over time in an industry. In this study, these
reports have been utilized mainly to identify which policies or regulations have been
significant to the mobile banking sectors in South Africa. The disadvantage of utilizing
these reports is that often the methodology utilized to reach findings is not accessible;
therefore, there is no direct way to check the validity of the findings.
Newspapers
I included newspapers in this analysis to give context about how mobile banking
regulations have influenced the mobile banking industry and to indicate whether the
closed and open regulatory categories that I have identified influenced the industries in
South Africa and Kenya in the ways that I have anticipated. I hypothesized that an open
regulatory environment encourages the development of mobile banking. I also
hypothesized that bank-led mobile banking services, such as those found in South Africa,
would not be conducive towards developing high levels of mobile banking development.
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Initially I limited my analysis of newspapers from the years 2005 to 2010. This
was informed by my assumption, based on previous research, indicating that the most
significant regulatory changes occurred after 2010. However, I decided to extend the
period of analysis to between 2008 and 2012. This is because in Kenya and South Africa,
the impact of mobile banking on the banking industry was initially not realized. During
this time, just after the 2008 financial crisis, topics such as consumer debt,
unemployment, a decline in foreign direct investment, and the downgrading of credit
ratings were topics that dominated the news headlines. I did not extend the time period
further beyond 2012, because the intention was to capture the transformative early stages
(the first wave) of mobile banking regulations and the industry responses to those
regulations.
In Kenya, I utilized the Daily Nation and the Business Daily as my primary
sources. Both newspapers are widely distributed in Kenya and have an audience of over 4
million daily readers. The Daily Nation does not specialize in reporting on financial or
business news but it does include a business segment within the papers which only
reports on business and financial news. In South Africa, I will utilize the Business Day as
well as the Sunday Times as secondary newspaper sources. These are two of the widely
circulated financial daily and weekly newspapers, respectively in South Africa.
The Sunday Times is a weekly, in-depth reporting, newspaper. Initially I had
opted to include another daily; however, the Sunday Times offered more detailed and
original content which is more valuable as greater insight and research go into the
reporting. All of the newspapers listed above do have different target audiences,
especially if business daily’s which report exclusively on news events which affect the
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economy and the financial markets, even though there are lifestyle features and sports
sections too. The other newspapers which cover some financial news and reporting focus
on topic areas of interest to the general public.
Utilizing various newspaper sources is useful because one of the disadvantages of
utilizing secondary analysis include issues concerning credibility and representativeness,
especially for newspaper sources, as their primary objective is not solely reporting on
news but also to draw reader interest (Singleton and Strait 2010). It is also important to
emphasize that the online editions of newspapers both in South Africa and Kenya do rely
on wire news articles accessed from international sources such as Thomson Reuters and
Bloomberg. These articles are purchased by local news sites to include as part of their
news offering. Only articles produced by the daily newspaper titles listed above will be
included in the analysis. This is because local newspaper articles may have a more
nuanced perspective of local issues as well as the historical background which may not be
emphasized in an international news article.
I searched for the relevant articles for all the newspaper titles on Lexis Nexis
Academic with the key words “mobile” and “banking” and “cell phones’” to identify the
articles that would be relevant. Even though the terms, “mobile” and “banking” and
“cellphone” are broad and generic, it was only these search terms that allowed me to get a
reasonable amount of results to search though. Other search terms that I included were
“cell phones”, “banking”, “regulations”, and “M-PESA”, for instance. However, these
search terms turned up very few and often unrelated articles.
I switched the search terms around numerous times because each different order
produced different search results. I then manually went through the articles to identify
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duplicate articles that may have been selected more than once during the initial search. I
also manually removed any articles that may have been reporting about mobile banking,
but not addressing mobile banking regulations.
I had anticipated that the search would identify a greater number of articles,
however, further analysis revealed a significant shortcoming. The term “mobile banking”
is often used interchangeably with “internet banking”. Mobile banking utilizes
applications that can either operate on WIG (utilize SMS based commands) or
Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) which facilitates real time messaging
between a mobile phone and bank servers (Mas and Kumar 2008). More advanced
phones, such as smart phones can also utilize WAP which requires internet access
(Porteus 2006). However, internet banking only relies on access to the internet to access
one’s personal banking account to make transfers, payments and check balances. Due to
this, a significant number of articles were not included. Other articles were not included
simply because they were not relevant to the topic, but other off-topic articles were also
included because the topic did have implications for the findings. Fifty seven articles
were included in the final thematic analysis. Thirty one of those articles were obtained
from the Sunday Times and the Business Day in South Africa and the remaining twenty
six were obtained from the Kenyan newspapers.
Utilizing the categories of open and closed mobile banking regulations that I had
conceptualized earlier, I used those categories as a broad coding strategy to conduct a
thematic analysis of the newspaper articles. Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest utilizing a
thematic approach to uncover themes from the data, however, I utilized a deductive
strategy because I had already identified the kinds of regulations (open or closed) that I
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was interested in observing and understanding the impact that they had on the mobile
banking industries of both countries. Thematic analysis is a “method for identifying,
analyzing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun and Clarke 2006: 79).
Thematic analysis allows data to be organized and interpreted at a rich level of analysis
and allows for a level of flexibility. The process was not linear, it was a more cyclical
process and I constantly referred back to the industry reports and previous research to
make sense of the findings. I tested how the two categories applied to the mobile banking
contexts of Kenya and South Africa and whether they matched up identified regulations.
Limitations of analysis
Lastly, the analytic process that I followed was deterministic, based on the two
categories I had intended to test. This could have led to a myopic analysis on the
newspaper articles because I only searched for evidence that either validated or
invalidated the open and closed regulatory approach. South Africa and Kenya are still in
the early process of drawing up regulations that will shape mobile banking in the future.
Therefore, it would be premature to state that the evidence found here provides a
definitive indication that these are the paths that regulations will follow in the future.
Therefore, one needs to guard against being overly deterministic and simplistic about the
impact of mobile banking regulations on mobile banking (Mahoney 2000).
Another disadvantage with the approach is that by choosing to study a number of
regulations, I am unable to highlight the significance of single regulations which in and
of themselves are substantial. They are important because of the rationale behind
introducing them as law and the political process involved in creating them, from drafting
the regulations to having them passed. That entire process is not considered here,
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however, this is why the inclusion of newspaper articles as a secondary form of analysis
is valuable because it does provide some background about the development process of
the regulations.
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FINDINGS AND DISCUSION

This section will be examined by answering each of the individual questions listed
in the previous chapter as well as addressing the hypotheses.
Question 1: What are the regulations that directly affect mobile banking in Kenya
and South Africa?
In both the cases of Kenya and South Africa; there is no specific prudential
regulation that directly affects mobile banking. All of the regulations listed below are
separate pieces of regulation that inform part of a broader regulatory system. It is
significant, but not unique, that there is no single overarching piece of regulation in both
countries. Other African countries such as Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda and Nigeria are also
only recently creating regulations that directly affect mobile banking and one of the
biggest challenges is that mobile banking affects two significant sectors; banking and
telecommunications.
In both the cases of South Africa and Kenya; this this does create regulatory gaps
and a lack of clarity about which industry should regulate mobile banking services. South
Africa and Kenya represent hybrid forms of regulations that have been greatly influenced
their own political landscape, the historical development of banking services and
institutions as well as the availability of banking infrastructure. However, as the evidence
below will illustrate, Kenya and South Africa, have followed two different regulatory
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paths and this significant implications for whether mobile banking is a viable form of
financial inclusion to meet the banking needs of those who are unable to access formal
financial services.
The table below lists the regulations identified from secondary sources which
make up the regulatory environment in South African and Kenya.
Table 3

List Of Regulations that Directly Impact Mobile Banking Services
Kenya

Regulations

South Africa

The Central Bank of Kenya Act of The South African Reserve Bank
2003, section 4(A) (1) (d), was
Act, 1989. This act allows the
amended in January 2009 in order to Reserve Bank to provide rules
promote innovations that improved which impact the payment,
service delivery and affordability for clearing or settlement systems of
mobile banking consumers. Part of banks.
this included promoting
interoperability between different
service providers allowing customers
to transfer money from different
mobile banking services.
National Payment System Act, 2011; The Banks Act, 1990; section 11
this regulates all e-money issuers,
of the act stipulates that only
how much money can be transferred registered banks can provide
through mobile banking services as banking services and mobile
well as any potential risks to the
banking falls under that umbrella.
broader payments system. The NPS Banking refers to accepting
also incorporates certain consumer deposits and soliciting deposits
protection sections affect basic
from the public. It is due to this
customer service obligations by
act that mobile banking service
service providers, complaint
providers can only provide
resolutions, and holding up
banking services if they partner
customers service agreements.
up with a bank that has been
granted license to operate and the
partnership needs to be approved
by the Registrar of Banks.
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Table 3 (Continued)
Kenya Information and
National Payment System
Communication (Amendment) Act, Act,1998. This act allows the
2013; this provides for the legal
bank to have regulatory and
recognition of electronic transactions supervisory powers to control and
specifically relating to (1) records prevent any potential risks to the
keeping, (2) preventing cyberpayment system. This is done
crimes, and (3) broadly providing through the management,
confidence for consumers and
administration, operation,
service providers in the reliability to regulation and supervision of
electronic transactions.
payment, clearing and payments
settlement systems.
Proceeds of Crime Act and AntiMoney laundering Act, 2009. Under
this regulation guidelines are
introduced that are intended to
implement and enforce sound antimoney laundering legislation that
directly affects mobile banking.
Mobile banking services providers
are supposed to know the identity of
account holders, report fraudulent
account activity and it also informs
mobile banking service providers
about the penalties that they may
face if they fail to meet any of the
stipulated guidelines.

Financial Intelligence Centre Act,
2001. Financial institutions are
required to adhere to the rules and
reporting requirements set out in
the act to prevent anti-money
laundering and terrorist financing
purposes

The Data Protection Bill, 2013; this Exchange Control Regulations
bill was tabled in order to cement the Act, 1961. Banks are permitted to
right to privacy recognized under the extend e-money activities across
Kenyan constitution. This bill speaks borders if they meet all the
to the rights of consumers in
requirements stipulated within the
choosing when their personal
Act.
information is shared and with
whom. This bill has not been passed
as official law, it is still under
debate, however, it has been
approved by the cabinet.
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Table 3 (Continued)
The Regulation of Interception of
Communication Act, 2010. RICA
requires all cellphone numbers to
be registered and this includes
SIM cards and data SIM cards in
phones and laptops for example.
The rationale behind RICA is to
create a nationwide database that
assists in crime prevention or
tracking down criminals through
their cellphone number.
Extra-ordinary
provision

The “Letter of No Objection” allows
Kenyan mobile operators to provide
mobile banking services to
consumers and is directly overseen
by the Central Bank of Kenya.

The table above lists all the regulations in South Africa and Kenya that have had a
significant impact on the development of mobile banking services. The table also
highlights some of the amendments that have been introduced that directly affect mobile
banking services.
Question 2: Are there any significant regulatory differences between Kenya and
South Africa and how do these differences impact the implementation of
mobile banking services?
Based on the analysis above, there are significant differences in how mobile
banking is regulated in Kenya and South Africa. The regulations above, in Table 4, were
categorized into six separate broad categories to give them meaning. The objective is to
illustrate what kinds of regulations are present in Kenya and South Africa and identify
whether they are open or closed regulations. This process is informed by the close
reading of other research papers as well as industry reports. The inclusion of the
newspaper articles is to identify how these regulations influence the development of
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mobile banking and to identify other categories that may be missed based on this
approach.
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NO

NO

Only banks
Deposits
issues e-money defined as
payments
YES (but
partial)

NO

YES

KYC (face-toCentral Bank
Multiple
face contact with issues licenses for institution
customer)
deposit taking
regulatory
oversight

Characteristics of open and closed banking regulations

NO

Bank-led mobile
banking services

YES
YES
YES (but
YES
NO
YES
Closed
partial)
regulation
The six categories identified here have been compiled from a close reading of the academic sources and industry reports compiled
by the World Bank, the IMF and the Unites Nations about which regulations impact mobile banking.

Open
regulation

Table 4
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Mobile banking has been successful Kenya due to a number of circumstances;
firstly the deregulation of the telecommunications sector through the Kenya
Communications Act of 1998 allowed mobile network operators to exist in a largely
liberalized environment. The changes in the regulatory framework led up to the
subsequent formation of the four dominant mobile phone operators in Kenya; Telkom
Orange, Safaricom, Celtel, and Econet (Omwansa 2009). Mobile banking is listed, under
law, as a service that telecommunications companies can provide; therefore it does fall
outside of their jurisdiction to offer mobile banking services (Sultana 2009).
The Communications Act was not established to regulate mobile banking or
mobile transactions. After 2006, Kenya enacted the Kenya ICT Policy which was
followed by the 2007 Electronic Transactions Bill; these policies were enacted with the
intention of promoting electronic commerce and not curtailing the telecommunications
sector (Omwansa 2009).
There are currently four mobile payment service providers in Kenya and the
Safaricom is the market leader. The other providers include Bharti Airtel, Orange, Mobile
Pay, and yuMobile. However, the arrangement that M-PESA, has had with the Central
Bank of Kenya is crucial. In 2007 the Central Bank decided to take on an “experiment
first, then regulate” position which allowed M-PESA to operate in an enabling
environment (Kimenyi and Ndungu’u 2009; Mas and Ng’weno 2010). In 2007, the
Central Bank of Kenya issued a “Letter of No Objection” that allowed M-PESA to
operate. The letter made basic requirements of M-PESA including (1) reporting to the
Central Bank, (2) safeguarding the integrity of the system, (3) preventing money
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laundering, (4) keeping records, and (5) observing Kenyan laws that affected customers
(Mas and Ng’weno 2010).
Even though many banks state that this allowed mobile payments system to hold
extraordinary advantage, the Central Bank has continued to promote the development of
mobile banking. However, in 2015, under pressure from banks, the Central Bank
conducted an audit of M-PESA, which the banks declared had an unfair advantage.
However, the Central Bank found that M-PESA is a safe product and conducts itself in
line with the country’s objectives for financial inclusion (Mas and Ng’weno 2010). The
Treasury department responded by introducing the National Payment System Bill in 2014
which expands the regulation that M-PESA and other mobile network operators face but
is largely intended to protect the integrity of the payments system in Kenya.
In 2014, the Central Bank began authorizing mobile virtual network operator
(MVNO) licenses to companies without their own telecommunications infrastructure
(Parrin 2015). This has also been a result of immense pressure from commercial banks.
This change allows for banks to not be left out of mobile payment services completely
and it gives them the power to set up their own mobile payments services without
needing to partner with mobile network operators. The potential impact of these changes
in Kenya could lead to market saturation as there already a number of service providers
but it could also lead to greater product innovations, and lower cost to the consumer
(Mulwa and Mazer 2014).
In Kenya, one of the most significant differences is that under the Central Bank of
Kenya Act and the National Payment System Act, deposit taking is an activity that can be
performed by any entity or financial institution. Kenya has structured, whether
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intentionally or not, it’s mobile banking space in an open approach. South Africa, on the
other hand has not.
Deposit taking, according to the Banks Act of 1990, can only be performed by
financial institutions that have acquired a banking license. Therefore, mobile network
operators in South Africa would not qualify, under this act, to provide mobile payment
services. However, under certain provisions, mainly by partnering with banks, mobile
network operators can provide these services. Any service that operates as a money
transfer platform is required to apply for a banking license, which comes with a mass of
regulatory restrictions to adhere to (Banking Association of South Africa 2015). This is
why; mobile banking service providers in South Africa have opted to launch their
platforms in association with traditional banks. This has also meant that mobile operators
in South Africa are not legally permitted to issue e-money (Sultana 2009).
A position paper published by the Reserve Bank in 2009, stipulated clearly that
“The fact of the matter is that the taking of deposits from the general public by an
unregistered person (non-bank) is a criminal offence in terms of the provisions of the
Banks Act” (SARB 2009: 6). The stringent regulation has created less of an open
environment. This is further compounded by FICA regulations that were introduced after
the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. to prevent the free, untraceable movement of money globally.
FICA regulations require individuals who open up bank accounts in South Africa to
present some proof of income, employment, address, and an identity document. However,
in 2015, amendments were introduced to FICA regulations that could potentially result in
Exemption 17 being removed.
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Exemption 17 was introduced in 2004 in an attempt to reduce the barriers of
opening a bank account in South Africa. Exemption 17 allowed South African citizens to
open bank accounts without having face-to-face interaction with a financial institution
and without providing a proof of address (Lawack-Davids 2012). This reduced the
bureaucratic hurdles that consumers had to face when attempting to open up a bank
account if they could do so utilizing their cellphone number as an identifier as opposed to
the previously mentioned identifier documents. If the amendment to the FICA regulations
passed in parliament, millions of customers may no longer be able to access their bank
accounts (Saunder, Estey and Cooper 2016).
To further complicate the bureaucratic process, RICA regulations also require
individuals to register their cellphone SIM card which means that individuals who are
unable to provide a prof of address and identity document may have their lines closed, as
the RICA penalties stipulate. Mobile network operators face the possibility of facing
heavy fines if they fail to comply with the rules. This means that even if mobile banking
services are available individuals who do not meet RICA regulations, mainly those who
are already financially excluded, may find it impossible to access formal financial
services (Notes 2010). This exposes these individuals to predatory service providers
where their consumer rights are not recognized or protected.
These circumstances provide some insight into why South Africa’s bank led
approach has failed to successfully launch mobile banking services in South Africa.
Vodacom partnered up with Safaricom’s M-PESA to bring mobile banking to South
Africa in 2010, however, by 2014, it relaunched the platform through a marketing
campaign because it had failed to attract a significant number of users (Tarrant 2015).
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MTN Mobile money was launched in 2011 in association with Standard Bank, however,
by 2012; Standard Bank purchased the customer base from MTN Mobile Money in South
Africa and incorporated it with its own additive mobile banking platform (IT News
Africa 2014; Standard Bank 2015).
Question 4: Are there contextual factors that influence mobile banking in Kenya
and South Africa?
The Kenyan Context
In Kenya, the subject concerning the lack of clear guidelines as to who should
regulate mobile banking in its entirety featured prominently in newspaper articles. The
agenda to have greater or specific regulations was consistently advocated for by the
commercial banks who acknowledged that their market share in the mobile payments
space was considerably challenged by non-banks such as mobile network operators. The
regulations that are currently in place were not developed to account for the convergence
of telecommunications and finance and this has led to a few regulatory gaps and
ambiguities. Below is an example of the kinds of remarks made by commercial bank
executives about the need for comprehensive regulation regarding mobile banking.
“Regulation is critical to ensure market confidence in long term investment. We
are worried about lack of oversight of the activities of agents dealing in mobile
money transfer services.” ~ The Nation, 2010.
It is significant to note that mobile banks are not pushing for greater regulation overall,
however, they are highlighting the lack of regulation of non-banks, who are their direct
consumers. What is noteworthy is the distinctive response of the Central Bank of Kenya
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which insists on introducing minimal regulations and increasing access. The Central
Bank recognizes that the lines separating mobile banking and banking are increasingly
becoming blurred but still considers mobile banking as having the potential to reach a
greater number of unbanked individuals. This is evidenced by a quote that the governor
of the bank made in 2011.
“For CBK, better regulation, as opposed to more regulation, means creating space
for innovation but also being ready, with adequate instruments, to deal with the
system's vulnerabilities" ~ Business Daily, 2010
However, at the same time, the Central Bank also acknowledged that the
guidelines that are put in place to monitor mobile banking do not provide some form of
consumer protection and also makes it easier to commit fraud whilst utilizing mobile
money. The National Payments Bill, introduced in 2011, was drafted in parts to address
some the regulatory shortcomings. The bill allows consumers, for example, to send –
money to consumers who operate on other networks, increasing interoperability and the
bill also ensures that if any mobile network operator were to collapse, consumers would
be able to have their funds reimbursed. The Central Bank also stressed that the National
Payments Bill would also bring mobile banking regulations in Kenya closer to
international reporting standards and focus on money laundering, system integrity,
insolvency, liquidity and legal risks.
Mobile network operators in Kenya on the other hand oppose stringent or
increased regulation for fears that it may increase their reporting compliance
requirements. Often times, mobile network operators stress that they do not operate in the
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same way that commercial banks do and that their services need not be regulated in the
same way that banks are. This quote below was said by a director of regulatory projects
company that works and lobbies for mobile network operators in East and West Africa.
“The mobile money transfer agents are critical in opening electronic (e)-money
accounts and exchanging e-money for cash and vice versa, yet they are not the
same as bank agents" ~ Business Daily, 2010
Mobile network operators are aware of the currently privileged position that they are in
and that is largely driven by the support that they receive from the Central Bank. That
support, in part, can be explained by the immense impact that mobile banking has on the
Kenyan economy. There are well over 20 million mobile money users in Kenya and in
2011 alone for example the amount of deposits made using the mobile phones grew by
16.4 per cent (Mugwe and Mark 2011). However, some mobile network operators,
typically smaller operators will limited market share, have opted to partner up with banks
in an effort to offer more comprehensive banking services. This usually takes the form of
having savings accounts (offered by banks) and making them an option for mobile
banking customers who can then transfer their e-money directly into their savings
account.
A considerable challenge for the Central Bank of Kenya is managing the
increased pressure of international organizations such as the World Bank and the Basel
Committee who have both pointed out the regulatory weaknesses that mobile banking
presents. The World Bank has highlighted that the informal nature of the mobile banking
space open it up to considerable risks.
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“The fact that the mobile agent owns the shop they work in, and are independent
as they only have a contract with the mobile operator, also came up as an issue of
concern.” ~ Business Daily, 2010
However, M-PESA, operated by Safaricom, has been able to be successful due to
the large network of cash agents who operate across Kenya. Safaricom and other mobile
operators has actively encouraged set up where they are able to access the most
customers and regulations that require greater reporting and streamlining of those agents
could see a decline in the growth of cash agents because mobile network operators may
transfer the costs of reporting onto agents. The World Bank emphasizes that its greatest
concerns lie with the lack of reporting and potential for fraud on a global scale. Antimoney laundering policies are a great concern for Kenya because of its proximity to
Somalia which has been labelled by the US as “high risk” and because of this has
received increased money transfer restrictions in over the last year because of concerns
that those funds were being funneled to support terrorist activity (Barry and Ensign
2016). The World Bank has proposed that mobile money be regulated both by the Central
Bank as well as the Communications Commission of Kenya. The quotes below capture
some of the concerns by the World Bank.
“These perceptions merit urgent attention because mobile financial service
providers may fall outside anti-money laundering and combating the financing of
terrorism controls generally adhered to by traditional financial institutions"
~ The Nation, 2012
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"Non-bank providers of financial services, such as telcos should be considered as
'Financial Institutions,' as defined by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)." ~
~ The Nation, 2012
It is important to note how mobile service providers in Kenya define themselves
as non-banks as this impacts their arguments for why they should not be treated as banks.
If non-banks are non-banks then they do essentially do not take on the same risks that
commercial banks take on in accepting customer deposits. However, this is a myopic
view of what banking is. Non-banks present an equal if not inherently different risks
through the products and services that it offers and the open regulatory environment in
Kenya has certainly acknowledged that by attempting to introduce more prudential
regulations to influence the mobile network operators to take less risks and be more
precautious. One of the advantages of the closed regulatory approach taken by South
Africa is the amount of protection is does offer to consumers who do have legal recourse
if their funds are mishandled or stolen as well as a banking sector that is less open to
external environmental risks because of the limitations that the regulatory body has
initiated.
The South African Context
The quote below captures some of the challenges present in the mobile banking
space in South Africa. The government South Africa has emphasized keeping up with
global financial reporting standards and this has led to a slower development of mobile
banking in the country.
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“With the additional bureaucracy banks will face in South Africa, it doesn't look
likely to be a wild commercial success. But if government thinks outside of the
box, and clears some regulatory hurdles, it might achieve the ultimate objective real financial services for the masses.” ~ Business Day, 2011
In South Africa, due the Banks Act, commercial banks have a considerable
advantage over mobile network operators within the mobile banking space because they
can apply for a banking license. Any service that operates as a money transfer platform is
required to apply for a banking license, which comes with a mass of regulatory
restrictions to adhere to (Banking Association of South Africa 2015). This is why; mobile
banking service providers in South Africa have opted to launch their platforms in
association with traditional banks. This has also meant that mobile operators in South
Africa are not legally permitted to issue e-money (Sultana 2009). Mobile network
operators recognize the challenging position they are in.
However, because banks have become centralized in the development of mobile
banking products and services, they have also utilized the services as a platform to extend
accessibility to cheap and unsecured loans. This disadvantages consumers who are
already disenfranchised by making it easier for them to access loans which they may be
unlikely to pay back. Krippner (2005), Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin (2011), Lapavistas
(2011) and Orhangazi (2007) illustrate that households in developing countries are
increasingly interacting with financial services and products at a higher rate than they
used to in the past. Due to the reach of mobile banking, more consumers have access to a
wider array of financial products, and in South Africa that comes in the form of cheap
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credit. In Kenya, there is also a proliferation of products such as loans, however, this is
also accompanied by an environment that is more competitive and offers consumers
cheaper access to those products. However, the increase in credit access overall could
still be negative for both the Kenyan and South African banking sectors.
“"Kenya has a far friendlier regulatory environment, which allows technology
companies to compete against banks," Richardson said.”~ Sunday Times, 2011
This statement was uttered by Brian Richardson who was the CEO of WIZZIT in
2011. WIZZIT was launched in 2004, and WIZZIT had anticipated that there were 16
million unbanked individuals in South Africa who represented an untapped market,
however, by 2010 WIZZIT had only signed up approximately 300 000 customers
(Bångens and Söderberg 2008). Other mobile money service providers which launched
after WIZZIT have also witnessed minimal success in South Africa. Mobile network
operators, in collaboration with banks, have failed to successfully launch mobile banking
in South Africa. Vodacom partnered up with Safaricom’s M-PESA to bring mobile
banking to South Africa in 2010, however, by 2014, it relaunched the platform through a
marketing campaign because it had failed to attract a significant number of users (Tarrant
2015). MTN Mobile money was launched in 2011 in association with Standard Bank,
however, by 2012; Standard Bank purchased the customer base from MTN Mobile
Money in South Africa and incorporated it with its own additive mobile banking platform
(IT News Africa 2014; Standard Bank 2015).
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“There is evidence of substantial ignorance about mobile banking, even among
presently banked customers, and also considerable mistrust of banking using these
devices." ~ Sunday Times, 2010
Another significant challenge for banks and mobile network operators is the
regulatory environment in South Africa. FICA regulations which are intended to align
South African banking regulations with international standards have been pursued by the
Department of Treasury as well as the Central Bank. However, this places limitation on
banks by making it more difficult for them to offer services to individuals who are unable
to present a proof of address or an identity document. FICA laws also make it difficult for
a significant number of foreign migrant workers in South Africa to gain access to banking
services. For example, the introduction of RICA, which requires all cellphone numbers to
be tied to a registered identity as well as an address, would leave a considerable number
of customers without access to mobile banking services. The impact of this regulation is
well captured in the article below published in the Business Day.
“More than 18-million South Africans do not have an ID number. More than 15million South Africans do not live in a street with a name and a number. The Post
Office recognizes only 6,5-million delivery addresses in the country. Since most
people who use prepaid cellphones are not formally employed, they,
understandably, also do not have a "business address". This will disqualify
millions of South Africans from using a cellphone.” ~ Business Day, 2009
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“"It's going to make it very difficult for those companies who are trying to
increase access to financial services by using telecommunication services due to
the barrier that is built into accessing these services" ~ Business Day, 2009
However, the banking environment in South Africa is significantly different
compared to Kenya. South Africa has more banking infrastructure and to a degree banks
are not encouraged to invest in mobile banking services because a significant amount of
their revenue is generated through banking fees (Business Tech 2015). Flamini,
McDonald and Schumacher (2009) found that banks in southern Africa, including South
Africa, gained a significant amount of their profits from high income and upper middle
income customers but compared to other African countries.
Therefore, the lower tier of the market is often ignored and even though mobile
network operators can service this market more affordable, regulatory restrictions do not
make this possible. The growth of consumer demand for credit and unsecured lenders
offering easier access to credit has also presented a considerable challenge for mobile
network operators who are viewed as a possible mechanism of making credit easier to
access if they are not tightly monitored. Regulators fear the growth of credit could lead to
a credit bubble in the future and because unsecured lending contributes just less than 10%
of all lending preventing further growth of credit is the target.
The South African environment is significantly different from Kenya’s context.
However, reporting about financial inclusion in the country is often reported on
positively because of the increased access to financial infrastructure and services, such as
ATMs and online banking. Interviews conducted with bank executives often included
conceptualizing mobile banking purely as another revenue stream as opposed to a method
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to advance financial inclusion. This could be part of the reason why commercial banks in
South Africa have struggled to launch successful mobile banking services.
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CONCLUSION

Even though South Africa was one of the first African countries to provide mobile
banking services, the bank-led approach that has been initiated by the South African
Reserve Bank has limited the opportunity for the advancement of mobile banking
services. The Reserve Bank often cites the risks associated with mobile banking services,
but it is also invested in maintaining in international status as a country with safe and
stable banking institutions. Evidence of this is provided by the implementation on FICA
regulations and back-tracking the advancements made in 2004 through Exemption 17.
All of these changes and additional requirements make it more challenging for
consumers to access financial services. Mobile banking service providers in South Africa
are forced to launch their platforms in association with traditional banks because they
cannot apply for banking licenses. This limits the affordability of services, but it also
centralizes the importance of banks instead of challenging banks. Perhaps banks in
dominant positions as less motivated to recognize the possible success of mobile banking
because of how that success has destabilized the banking sector in Kenya. Closed
regulatory environments take a more conservative approach to the development of mobile
banking services and generally privilege and centralize the position of commercial banks.
The closed regulatory approach in South Africa has also developed because
banks, which play a far more central role, have established themselves as having greater
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institutional legitimacy. This is perhaps why mobile banking services that have been
offered to consumers have not been as successful because consumers still associate ‘brick
and mortar’ banking services as being providing ‘real banking services’. This is unlike
the context on Kenya, where banks largely ignored consumers that formed part of the
bottom of the pyramid, therefore when alternative services were offered by non-banks
there was no room for commercial banks to challenge their legitimacy.
The significance of financial inclusion on the global development agenda and
attached to that the growth of mobile banking as a solution to deal with the high number
of unbanked consumers in the global south developed the success and failures of the
microfinance. Microfinance refers to the provision small, low interest loans for purposes
such as farming or starting small business. Many of the projects focused on providing
low interest loans to women and farmers in countries with high poverty and high
unemployment rates (Ssendi and Anderson 2009).
The disadvantages of microfinance became apparent when microfinance
organizations also became profitable investment opportunities which shifted the aims of
microfinance from simply being about development to being about increasing investment
opportunity. This move affected consumers who had accessed credit that they were
unable to pay back to microfinance institutions but also led to the proliferation of the
microfinance industry in the global south. The open regulatory policy stance that is being
followed by Kenya has the potential to develop in a similar way. Open regulatory
environments are those that encourage the development of mobile banking services, are
fluid, and typically accommodate multiple players within the banking network.
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Little government oversight means that the mobile banking industry is at risk of
being overtaken to service providers who do not have the same objectives that the Central
Bank of Kenya does and that is to encourage innovation to the benefit of consumers.
External environmental changes could lead Kenya to develop a more hybrid approach
that incorporates some of the advantages of a closed regulatory approach which includes
more institutional oversight of financial service providers but also the potential of having
a stable banking sector that can deal with external shocks. This would also limit
consumers risk and expand consumers rights, which under the open regulations, are not
protected.
Mobile banking has led to greater accessibility in Kenya due to a number of
circumstances such as rigorous advertising by companies and mobile network operators
that have extensively invested in creating easily accessible cash-in/cash-out options (Mas
and Ng’weno 2010). However, the arrangement that M-PESA, the dominant mobile
banking service provider, has had with the Central Bank of Kenya is crucial. The central
bank decided to take on an “experiment first, then regulate” position which allowed MPESA to operate in an enabling environment (Kimenyi and Ndungu’u 2009; Mas and
Ng’weno 2010). A mobile payment systems relying on e-money fell outside the
provisions of the banking law, but since the beginning M-PESA developed a model that
provided sufficient oversight to comfort the central bank (Mas and Ng’weno 2010).
Regulations that have come after this period have also been favorable towards
mobile banking service providers because the Central Bank of Kenya has advanced
changes that have (1) made it easier for consumers to access mobile banking services, (2)
encouraged interoperability making the services more useful for consumers and, (3)
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ultimately increasing competition within the industry even though there are a few
monopolies. Regulations in Kenya are more directed towards encouraging financial
inclusion at all levels of government and actively challenging the dominance of banks.
Future research considerations
Future research should examine whether the open and closed regulatory approach
applies to other countries with developing mobile banking sectors. Further insight into
the nexus between politics and banking regulations would also be insightful because that
was information that could not be accessed in this research. However, it could provide
key contextual information about why certain regulatory decisions are made and others
are not. This contextual information can be provided by conducting interviews with key
players within these Kenyan and South African environments and this would also be
fruitful because both environments are experiencing significant changes currently. The
changes described in this study highlight some of the significant regulations that have
shaped the regulatory environments in South Africa and Kenya; however, future
directions could lead to very different policy directions. The hybrid regulatory
environment described above could lead to Kenya, for example, adopting some of the
closed regulatory environment characteristics in order to make up for some of the risks
which do not protect consumers from risks. In the South Africa case, this could lead to a
loss of power by commercial banks who may find themselves is less strategically
powerful roles in their own fields. This could happen in the South African regulatory
environment shifts to incorporate non-banks and allowing those players to apply for
banking licenses for example or loosening FICA and RICA regulations.
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Also including other countries to the analysis, within sub-Saharan Africa, this
could possibly include Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Mozambique which have
also developed fast growing mobile banking services. It would interesting to compare
whether any of these countries follow a closed and open regulatory approach or whether
they follow a completely different regulatory pathway.
Limitations
The case comparison method is advantageous because it allows one to study
detailed and unique processes, however, this comes with trade-offs. Unlike, statistical
methods, one cannot analyze whether the cases included in this analysis represent the
norm or that they represent outliers. More formal case-analysis such as the set-analysis
that Ragin (2008) proposes could account for this, however, method of analysis is more
valuable if there are more than ten cases to compare (Bennet and Elman 2006). Case
study methods in their nature, study past events, therefore, there is weak justification for
predictability (Bennet and Elman 2006). The selection of cases is crucial because this
method is susceptible to selecting cases on the dependent variable, especially where more
than two cases are selected. In this paper the objective was to compare cases where an
outcome was present and not present, further analyses that include more cases would
need to take that into consideration.
The findings and the theory building that form part of the outcomes of this study
are shaped by the two cases which are included in the analysis. Therefore, even the
evidence indicates that the conceptualization of open and closed mobile banking
regulations does have some merit in trying to understanding mobile banking regulations,
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caution should be practiced when attempting to make generalizations about other
contexts where mobile banking levels are low or high.
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